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gLaTT v. Fox SearChLIghT PICTUreS INC.
 For years, internships have been a fundamental building block for successful 
careers.1 Today, students at all education levels still apply for, and gladly accept, 
unpaid internships,2 hoping to apply the knowledge they learn in the classroom to 
real-world experiences in order to develop their skill set and, in many cases, gain 
subsequent employment.3 A 2012 study by the National Association of Colleges and 
Employers found that more than one third of unpaid internships resulted in job 
offers.4 However, a string of recent lawsuits against employers over the legality of 
unpaid internships may change the employment landscape as we know it.5 In an 
effort to avoid being sued, several employers have ceased offering unpaid internships, 
even though many students still long for the chance to work without pay.6
 In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York considered, inter alia, whether Fox Searchlight (“Searchlight”) 
violated federal and state labor laws when it classified two workers, Eric Glatt and 
Alexander Footman, as unpaid interns.7 The district court granted Glatt and 
Footman’s motion for summary judgment, holding that they were actually 
“employees” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).8 In reaching its decision, 
the Glatt court focused primarily on a fact sheet created by the Wage and Hour 
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), which set out a six-factor test to 
ascertain when an internship may be unpaid.9
 This case comment contends that the Glatt court: (1) gave undue deference to the 
DOL factors;10 (2) failed to adequately consider factors such as “the primary 
1. Beth Braccio Hering, Why Are Internships So Important?, CNN (Apr. 14, 2010, 11:09 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2010/LIVING/worklife/04/14/cb.why.internships.important/.
2. Mehroz Baig, Unpaid Internships for Graduates Now the New Norm, Huffington Post (Sept. 12, 2013, 
10:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mehroz-baig/unpaid-internships-for-gr_b_3908475.html.
3. Heather Huhman, Why You Should Get a Summer Internship, U.S. News (Apr. 29, 2011, 9:00 AM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2011/04/29/why-you-should-get-a-
summer-internship.
4. See Susan Adams, Odds Are Your Internship Will Get You a Job, Forbes (July 25, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2012/07/25/odds-are-your-internship-will-get-you-a-job/; Lynne 
Guey, A Shocking Number of Unpaid Internships Could Be Illegal, Bus. Insider (June 24, 2013, 10:41 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/is-my-unpaid-internship-illegal-2013-6.
5. Id.
6. See Cara Buckley, Sued Over Pay, Publisher Ends Internship Program, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 2013, at A23; 
Sam Hananel, Unpaid Internships in Jeopardy After Court Ruling, Associated Press (June 13, 2013, 
4:27 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/unpaid-internships-jeopardy-after-court-ruling.
7. 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
8. Id. at 538–39.
9. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage & Hour Div., Fact  Sheet  #71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (Apr. 2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf [hereinafter Fact 
Sheet #71].
10. As discussed infra, the Department of Labor (DOL) factors are not entitled to deference under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. because they were promulgated in an opinion letter 
by the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). “[I]nterpretations contained in 
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines  .  .  . are beyond the Chevron pale.” 
593
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
beneficiary test” and the “economic realities” of the relationship in determining Glatt 
and Footman’s employment status;11 and (3) relied on a f lawed interpretation of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.12 The Glatt court 
set a dangerous precedent that threatens to affect all employers who wish to retain 
the services of unpaid interns, as well as students whose only avenue for breaking 
into niche industries may be through unpaid internships.
 Eric Glatt worked for Searchlight from approximately December 2009 through 
August 2010.13 He initially worked on the production phase of the film Black Swan 
in New York as an unpaid intern and went on to accept another unpaid position 
relating to the film’s post-production.14 Glatt’s responsibilities on the production of 
Black Swan included obtaining documents for personnel files, picking up paychecks 
for co-workers, tracking and reconciling purchase orders, and traveling to the set for 
managers’ signatures.15 In his post-production internship, he performed other “basic 
administrative work such as drafting cover letters, organizing filing cabinets, making 
photocopies, and running errands.”16
 Alexander Footman worked for Searchlight as an unpaid intern from approximately 
October 2009 through February 2010.17 His responsibilities were similar to Glatt’s in 
the production of Black Swan, with additional duties that included assembling office 
furniture, arranging travel plans, taking out the trash, collecting lunch orders, 
answering phones, watermarking scripts, and making deliveries.18
 While their work mostly involved low-level administrative tasks, Glatt and 
Footman received tangible benefits from their time at Searchlight, “such as resume 
listings, job references, and an understanding of how a production office works.”19 
Glatt and Footman were not paid for their work and both testified that they had 
understood they would not be receiving wages when accepting their positions.20
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (citation omitted); see also Christensen v. Harris 
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (finding a similar multifactor test released in an opinion letter as not 
“warrant[ing] Chevron-style deference”). Nor are the DOL factors entitled to deference under Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 221 (noting that under Skidmore an 
agency interpretation is “eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness” (citation omitted)).
11. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533; see also Deborah F. Harris, When Is Individual in Training an “Employee” for 
Purposes of § 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(1)), 50 A.L.R. Fed. 632, § 5 
(1980) (describing the “economic realities” approach under the FLSA).
12. 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
13. Class Action Complaint at 8, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP)).
14. Id. at 60.
15. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533.
16. Id.
17. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, at 12. 
18. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533.
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 534. 
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 Glatt and Footman (“plaintiffs”) filed their complaint against Searchlight 
(“defendant”) on September 28, 2011,21 and the court granted their motion for 
summary judgment on June 11, 2013.22 Plaintiffs argued that they did not fall under 
the “trainee” exception established by the Supreme Court in Walling, and pressed the 
court to apply the DOL six-factor test23 as the standard for determining employment 
status under the FLSA.24 Plaintiffs contended that because Searchlight improperly 
classified them as interns, Searchlight had “denied them the benefits that the law 
affords to employees, including unemployment and workers’ compensation insurance, 
sexual harassment and discrimination protections, and, most crucially, the right to 
earn a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work.”25
 Defendant argued that the DOL’s six-factor test was not the applicable standard26 
and urged the court to apply the primary beneficiary test, under which employment 
status turns on whether the benefits an intern derives from his work outweigh any 
benefits to the employer.27
 The court acknowledged that the majority of circuit courts have rejected the 
DOL six-factor test in favor of the primary beneficiary test.28 However, the court 
reasoned that the DOL factors were entitled to deference,29 and were the applicable 
standard because the test had support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Walling.30 
21. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 13. The complaint was part of a larger class action lawsuit 
against multiple divisions of Fox Entertainment Group. See id.
22. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 516.
23. The six factors to be considered are:
(1) The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the 
employer, is similar to training which would be given in an educational environment; 
(2) The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; (3) The intern does not 
displace regular employees, but works under close supervision of existing staff; (4) The 
employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities 
of the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; (5) The intern is 
not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and (6) The employer 
and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in 
the internship.
 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 9.
24. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, at 2; see also Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 
(1947) (recognizing a trainee exception to the FLSA’s minimum-wage requirement). 
25. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, at 3.
26. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 531.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 532. The Glatt court reasoned that the DOL factors should be given Chevron deference “[b]ecause 
they were promulgated by the agency charged with administering the FLSA and [were] a reasonable 
application of it.” Id. However, as explained infra, agency interpretations not enacted pursuant to APA 
procedures, such as Fact Sheet #71, “are beyond the Chevron pale.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (citation omitted).
30. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532 (citing Xuedan Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). While 
Walling was decided before the release of Fact Sheet #71, the Glatt court found that some of the DOL 
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 The Glatt court’s decision to focus exclusively on the DOL factors in determining 
Glatt and Footman’s employment status was unsupported by case law.31 First, the 
court erred by deferring to the DOL multifactor test, which warrant neither Chevron 
nor Skidmore deference. As contained in an opinion letter issued by the Wage and 
Hour Division, the DOL factors lack the force of law to warrant deference from the 
courts.32 Second, while the DOL factors may be one of many considerations in a 
totality of the circumstances analysis, precedent in the Second Circuit precludes 
lower courts from treating these factors as the only relevant considerations.33 In 
purporting to evaluate the totality of the circumstances, the Glatt court did not 
adequately weigh important aspects of the employment relationship because it 
ignored both the primary beneficiary test and the economic realities34 of the 
employment relationship.35 Third, the Glatt court improperly construed Walling’s 
“immediate advantage” language36 to reach the conclusion that Glatt and Footman 
were employees of Searchlight.37
factors tracked the language of the Walling opinion. Specifically, the benefit the intern derives from the 
work, a relevant consideration under Wailing, is ref lected in the second factor of the DOL six-factor 
test—i.e., “[t]he internship experience is for the benefit of the intern.” Fact Sheet #71, supra note 9; see 
also Walling, 330 U.S. at 152 (noting that the FLSA “cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose 
work serves only his own interest an employee of another person who gives him aid and instruction”). 
But as some courts have concluded, Wailing “rested upon whether the trainees received the primary 
benefit of the work they performed.” Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 526 
(6th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the Wailing court’s enumeration of other factors in dicta does not suggest 
that these factors “must be present in future cases to foreclose an employment relationship.” Id. at 526 
n.2. 
31. Extensive research by the author for other courts that primarily focused on the DOL six-factor test and 
brushed over the “primary beneficiary test” or the “economic realities” of the employment relationship 
were unsuccessful.
32. See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
33. “The determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists does not depend on ‘isolated 
factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’” Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 326 
(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)); see also Archie 
v. Grand Cent. P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
34. When courts consider the economic realities of an employment relationship, they look at whether the 
worker relies financially on the alleged employer and expects compensation for his or her services. See 
Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (noting that economic realities are a relevant consideration 
under the FLSA); Solis, 642 F.3d at 522 (“[I]t is the ‘economic reality’ of the relationship between 
parties that determines whether their relationship is one of employment or something else.”).
35. The Glatt court applied the second factor of the DOL multifactor test, which considers whether the 
intern benefits from the internship. But that factor involves a different question (and often leads to a 
different result) than the one underlying the primary beneficiary test. So much was conceded by the 
Glatt court. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532 (noting that under defendant’s approach “the very same 
internship position might be compensable as to one intern, who took little from the experience, and not 
compensable as to another, who learned a lot”).
36. Walling, 330 U.S. at 153.
37. See infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
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 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to articulate a bright-line test for determining 
employment status under the FLSA.38 The Court’s 1947 Walling decision remains 
the most commonly cited case on the issue.39 Therein, the Court considered whether 
a railroad, which gave practical training courses to prospective yard brakemen over a 
seven- to eight-day period, should have compensated its trainees.40 The railroad 
never intended to pay the trainees and the trainees never expected to receive a wage 
in return for their work.41 The Court stated that the FLSA definition of “employ” 
was “obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any 
express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on 
the premises of another.”42 The Court reasoned that because the railroad received no 
immediate advantage from the work done by the trainees, the trainees were not 
employees under the FLSA.43
 In April 2010, the Wage and Hour Division released Fact Sheet #71, an opinion 
letter which lays out a six-factor test for “determin[ing] whether interns must be paid 
the minimum wage and overtime under the [FLSA] for the services that they provide 
to ‘for-profit’ private sector employers.”44
 Unlike interpretations reached after notice-and-comment rulemaking or during 
formal adjudication, the DOL guidelines (which are akin to policy statements) “lack 
the force of law” and are therefore not entitled to Chevron deference.45 At most, the 
guidelines are “entitled to respect” under Skidmore, and even then “only to the extent 
that [they] have the ‘power to persuade.’”46 While courts may defer to agency 
interpretations issued in opinion letters if they meet the standard set forth in 
38. Andrew Mark Bennett, Unpaid Internships & the Department of Labor: The Impact of Underenforcement of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act on Equal Opportunity, 11 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 
293, 305 (2011).
39. Walling, 330 U.S. at 148.
40. Id. at 149.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 150; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006) (defining “employ” to include those who employers “suffer 
or permit to work”). The FLSA only exempts medical interns. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.304(c) (2006).
43. Walling, 330 U.S. at 150. In Wailing, the trainees actually delayed the railroad’s work. Id.
44. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 9. While Fact Sheet #71 was released in 2010, the DOL six-factor test pre-
dates 2010 and has appeared in opinion letters “since at least 1967.” Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 
F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993). See supra note 23 for the DOL factors.
45. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as those in opinion 
letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”); Reno v. Koray, 
515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (noting that agency interpretations which are not “subject to the rigors of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, including public notice and comment,” warrant no deference under 
Chevron); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding 
that deference may be warranted where the agency interprets a statute it is charged with enforcing).
46. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
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Skidmore,47 the Glatt court erred by according the DOL factors deference on the 
ground that they are “entitled” to it.48
 Further, while the DOL factors are properly reviewed under Skidmore’s lower 
level of deference,49 the factors do not merit Skidmore “respect” because the test they 
purport to establish is self-contradictory. At one point, Fact Sheet #71 states that the 
determination “depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of each such 
program,” and yet later it states that “all of the factors” must be met.50 Whether the 
DOL intended for the totality of the circumstances to be the ultimate inquiry under 
the FLSA or whether each of the six factors must be met is unclear.51 Moreover, to 
the extent that the DOL guidelines fail to take the totality of the circumstances into 
consideration, this rigid approach runs contrary to Wailing, providing an additional 
basis for withholding deference under Skidmore.52
 There is little agreement across jurisdictions on the standard for determining 
employment status under the FLSA.53 Circuit courts across the country are split on 
when and how to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Walling, the DOL six-factor 
test, the primary beneficiary test, and the economic realities of the employment 
relationship approach.54
47. The level of deference Skidmore accords to an agency interpretation “depend[s] upon the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
48. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532. 
49. “Most commentators and courts have interpreted [Skidmore] as ref lecting a very weak form of deference. 
This lesser level of deference is commonly described as “Skidmore” deference to distinguish it from the 
stronger deference mandated by Chevron.” William F. Funk et al., Administrative Procedure 
and Practice 386 (5th ed. 2014).
50. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 9.
51. See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Harris, supra 
note 11; Bennett, supra note 38.
52. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Solis, 642 F.3d at 525 
(rejecting the DOL six-factor test as “overly rigid and inconsistent with a totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach”). Fact Sheet #71 does, however, provide “a framework for an analysis of the employee-
employer relationship,” and has thus been used as part of a totality of the circumstances approach in 
determining employment status under the FLSA. See Bennett, supra note 38 (“Where federal courts 
apply the six-part test, they apply the six parts as factors to consider in a totality of the circumstances 
analysis rather than the all-or-nothing approach applied by the [DOL].”); see also Xuedan Wang v. 
Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 
532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
53. See Bernice Bird, Preventing Employer Misclassification of Student Interns and Trainees, Cornell HR 
Rev. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.cornellhrreview.org/preventing-employer-misclassif ication-of-
student-interns-and-trainees/ (“The federal courts have not agreed upon a test in determining 
employment status of a trainee or intern.”); see also Bennett, supra note 38. 
54. The Fourth Circuit considers who “principally benefit[s]” from an employment relationship. McLaughlin 
v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that trainees who accompanied and assisted 
experienced snack food route-men during a week-long orientation period were employees covered by the 
FLSA). Whereas the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test based on Walling, which considers: 
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 The Second Circuit, where the Glatt court sits, has embraced a multifaceted 
employment test that considers the totality of the circumstances, uses the DOL 
factors as helpful guidelines, places a key consideration on the primary beneficiary 
test, and looks at the economic realities of the employment relationship.55 Thus, as 
the Second Circuit noted in Velez v. Sanchez, “The determination of whether an 
employer-employee relationship exists does not depend on ‘isolated factors but rather 
upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’”56 Although Velez involved a domestic 
worker, rather than unpaid interns, this totality of the circumstances approach is an 
overarching principle which the Second Circuit has applied in every context it has 
addressed under the FLSA.57
 Therefore, even though the scope of employment at issue in Velez differs from 
that in Glatt, the Glatt court should have still followed Velez’s controlling principle. 
As the Tenth Circuit noted in Reich, although “the factors distinguishing [domestic 
workers] from [household members] are different from the factors distinguishing 
employees from trainees, [it is] informative that determinations of employee status 
under FLSA in other contexts are not subject to rigid tests but rather to consideration 
of a number of criteria in their totality.”58
 In Glatt, the court paid lip service to the totality of the circumstances approach 
mandated by the Second Circuit.59 First, the Glatt court warned of expanding the 
trainee exception created by the Supreme Court in Walling, without explaining how 
“(1) whether the trainee displaces regular employees; (2) whether the trainee works solely for his or her 
own benefit; and (3) whether the company derives any immediate benefit from the trainee’s work.” 
Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271–73 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that participants in a 
f light attendant training program at an airline’s training school were not employees of the airline). The 
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, combines the Supreme Court’s approach in Walling with an “economic 
realities” consideration, which in turn asks whether the worker relies financially on the alleged employer 
and expects compensation for his services. Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 
1996); see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (“The test of 
employment under the [FLSA] is one of ‘economic reality.’”). Finally, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits 
apply the primary beneficiary test. See Solis, 642 F.3d at 531 (finding that students at a boarding school 
who worked in the kitchen and housekeeping departments were not employees under the FLSA because 
the students were the primary beneficiaries of the work they performed); Reich, 992 F.2d at 1028 
(finding that firefighter trainees who attended a firefighting academy maintained equipment and 
staffed a truck for a few weeks were not employees because the trainees were the primary beneficiaries 
of the work they performed). Circuit courts are thus clearly unable to agree on a uniform approach for 
determining employment status under the FLSA. See Harris, supra note 11, § 2 (“[T]he courts have 
employed several tests in determining whether a trainee qualifies as an employee.”).
55. See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 309, 330 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Archie, 997 F. Supp. at 531.
56. 693 F.3d at 326 (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).
57. See, e.g., Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2008) (addressing 
whether nurses can be considered employees of two different hospitals); Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 
735 F.2d 8, 12 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (addressing whether inmates participating in an education program 
are employees of the sponsoring college); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(dealing with employment status in the garment industry).
58. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
59. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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this concern favors foregoing a comprehensive analysis.60 Second, the court called the 
primary beneficiary test “subjective and unpredictable,”61 even though a majority of 
courts have successfully applied it,62 and its importance has been particularly 
emphasized by the Second Circuit.63
 The Glatt court also failed to consider the economic realities of the relationship 
between plaintiffs and Searchlight.64 Instead, the court relied exclusively on the 
DOL six-factor test on the ground that it had support in Walling and was entitled to 
deference under Chevron.65 However, the Glatt court erred by mechanically applying 
the DOL six-factor test because circuit precedent required the court to engage in a 
far more comprehensive analysis.66
 The Glatt court ignored Second Circuit precedent making the primary beneficiary 
test a key consideration67 and, instead, subsumed that test under its analysis of the 
second DOL factor.68 Giving little insight into its reasoning, the court determined that 
Glatt and Footman were not the primary beneficiaries of the relationship, and provided 
no more than a few lines of analysis—a far cry from making the primary beneficiary 
test a key consideration.69 Further, ignoring the economic realities of the relationship 
was erroneous and contrary to Supreme Court precedent, which requires that the 
ultimate question of employment status under the FLSA “[be] one of ‘economic 
60. Id. at 532; see also Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947).
61. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532. 
62. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., 
Inc., 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011); Reich, 992 F.2d 1023.
63. See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 330 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A court should also consider who is the primary 
recipient of benefits from the relationship. This is the approach taken by courts determining if trainees and 
students providing services as part of their education are also employees.” (footnote and citation omitted)).
64. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532–34. But see Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“[T]he ‘economic reality’ test encompasses the totality of circumstances, no one of which is exclusive. 
Since economic reality is determined based upon all the circumstances, any relevant evidence may be 
examined so as to avoid having the test confined to a narrow legalistic definition.”).
65. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532; see also supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
67. Velez, 693 F.3d at 330. 
68. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533. 
69. The passage applying the “primary beneficiary test” reads as follows:
Undoubtedly, Glatt and Footman received some benefits from their internships, such as 
resume listings, job references, and an understanding of how a production office works. 
But those benefits were incidental to working in the office like any other employee and 
were not the result of internships intentionally structured to benefit them. Resume 
listings and job references result from any work relationship, paid or unpaid, and are not 
the academic or vocational training benefits envisioned by this factor. On the other 
hand, Searchlight received the benefits of their unpaid work, which otherwise would 
have required paid employees.
 Id. This was determined as part of the second factor of the DOL multifactor test.
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reality.’”70 Thus, courts have generally considered the economic realities of the 
relationship to determine whether interns who receive practical experience are properly 
classified as employees.71 In Glatt, the DOL six-factor test was the court’s only 
consideration in determining Glatt and Footman’s employment status. Practical 
experience is exactly what Glatt and Footman received72 and, as a matter of economic 
reality, they were neither financially dependent on Searchlight73 nor did they expect to 
be compensated for their work,74 which the Glatt court effectively refused to consider.75
 Finally, the Glatt court erroneously relied on Wailing’s “immediate advantage” 
language.76 In concluding that Glatt and Footman were improperly classified as 
unpaid interns, the court observed that they provided an immediate advantage to 
their employer.77 While it is true that plaintiffs provided Searchlight with an 
immediate advantage, that alone does not establish an employment relationship 
under the FLSA.78 In Walling, the Supreme Court held that the railroad trainees 
were not employees “because the defendant railroads received no ‘immediate 
advantage’ from the trainees.”79 However, “it does not logically follow that the reverse 
is true, i.e. [sic] that the presence of an ‘immediate advantage’ alone creates an 
employment relationship under the FLSA.”80 The Glatt court did just that; it assumed 
that because Searchlight received an immediate advantage, an employment 
relationship existed under the FLSA.81 For this to be so, the Glatt court would have 
needed to consider the immediate advantage test as part of a totality of the 
70. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985); see also Velez, 693 F.3d at 326 
(“The nature of the [employer-employee] relationship . . . depends on its ‘economic reality.’”). 
71. See Harris, supra note 11, § 5.
72. Specifically, Glatt and Footman learned how a production office works. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532–33.
73. See Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that “economic reality” goes 
to whether the alleged employees “expected to receive in-kind benefits—and expected them in exchange 
for their services”); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(asking “whether, as a matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent upon the 
alleged employer”).
74. Glatt and Footman both testified that they did not expect to be paid for their work. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. 
at 534.
75. The Glatt court reasoned that “this factor adds little” on the ground that “the FLSA does not allow 
employees to waive their entitlement to wages.” Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 534. While true, the court’s 
reasoning is circular. To be sure, employees may not waive their right to receive wages under the FLSA. 
But whether an alleged employee has a right to wages in the first place depends at least in part on 
whether the employee expected to be compensated for his work. See cases cited supra note 73. It was 
therefore sheer circularity to refuse to accord this factor its proper weight.
76. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947).
77. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 534.
78. Xuedan Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). While Wang, as a district court case, 
did not bind the Glatt court, Wang highlights the inconsistency of outcomes within the Second Circuit.
79. Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493 (citing Walling, 330 U.S. at 153).
80. Id.
81. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 534.
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circumstances analysis, which it failed to do.82 Thus, the court’s reliance on Wailing 
is misplaced, and its conclusion that plaintiffs were employees merely because they 
provided an immediate advantage to Searchlight is f lawed.83
 The Glatt court erred in holding that Searchlight violated the FSLA by classifying 
Glatt and Footman as interns. The court gave undue deference to the DOL six-factor 
test, which lacks the force of law to warrant deference under Chevron, and whose rigidity 
and ambiguity preclude according it even Skidmore-level deference. Moreover, the court 
also ignored settled precedent by failing to properly consider the primary beneficiary 
and the economic realities of the employment relationship, ultimately grounding its 
conclusion on a flawed interpretation of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Walling.
 The Glatt decision has already led to the elimination of several unpaid internships 
in New York and is likely to have further ramifications.84 The inconsistency in 
outcomes of recent intern-employment suits in the Second Circuit leaves the legality 
of unpaid internships in question.85 Employers, and students hoping to obtain unpaid 
internships in the future, are left in a precarious position. Glatt and similar decisions 
could ultimately result in an under-skilled workforce due to the lack of hands-on 
positions available to students. It may seem unlikely, but the Glatt decision could 
eventually hinder business growth in the United States as companies are forced to 
spend additional time training new employees who could have learned some of the 
required skills through unpaid internships. This in turn could lead to a higher 
employee turnover rate insofar as unpaid internships allow employers a trial period 
over which to decide whether a potential employee is the right fit for their organization.
 From an intern’s perspective, those students who may not otherwise have the 
chance to network and get a birds-eye view of a certain industry are able to experience 
and learn about a particular area they may want to work in one day. Further, 
candidates who have qualities that may not show up on a resume or in an interview 
will be less likely to obtain a permanent position because a potential employer will 
not have the first-hand benefit of seeing that student’s work capabilities. The 
elimination of unpaid internships threatens all potential employees and employers 
who provide invaluable experience to students who, for their part, have worked hard 
to obtain these positions, causing a ripple effect with already-apparent consequences—
and some that are yet to be seen.
82. See id. at 532–34. 
83. See id. at 534; Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493. 
84. Buckley, supra note 6. In October 2014, NBCUniversal agreed to pay $6.4 million to settle a class action 
lawsuit filed by former Saturday Night Live unpaid interns who “accused NBCUniversal of illegally 
classifying them as interns exempt from federal and state minimum wage and spread-of-hours pay.” 
Aaron Smith, ‘SNL’ Interns Reach $6.4 Million Settlement with NBCUniversal, CNN Money (Oct. 24, 
2014, 9:19 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/24/media/snl-intern-lawsuit/.
85. Compare Wang, 293 F.R.D. 489, with Glatt, 293 F.R.D. 516. The Glatt litigation can be seen as “part of 
a nationwide trend of class-action lawyers attacking internship opportunities provided by companies in 
the media and entertainment industry.” Julia Marsh, Ex-Intern Drops Suit, Apologizes to Letterman, Page 
Six (Sept. 10, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://pagesix.com/2014/09/10/former-intern-apologizes-to-letterman-
after-dropping-lawsuit/?_ga=1.94890012.1208659575.1384463952.
